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S O C I A L  S C I E N C E S
Focal random selection closes the gender gap 
in competitiveness
Joël Berger1, Margit Osterloh2,3, Katja Rost4*
Gender differences in choosing to enter competitions are an important cause of the leaky pipeline for women in 
leadership roles and represent a considerable waste of human resources. We used an incentivized laboratory ex-
periment to evaluate whether the introduction of random elements alters the gender gap in competitiveness. We 
found that focal random selection from a preselected pool removes the difference in competitiveness between 
men and women and does not dilute the qualifications of the entrants. The percentage of women who took part 
in competitions was nearly triple, and that of high-ability women double, with focal random selection compared 
to selection in pure performance competitions. In contrast, the behavior of men remained largely unchanged. 
Focal random selection closes the gender gap in competitiveness and can substantially enlarge the pool of 
high-performing women who apply for top jobs.
INTRODUCTION
Numerous laboratory and field experiments have demonstrated that 
women opt out of competition more than men, even when they are 
equally or better qualified (1–7). When women shy away from com-
petition, they have poor chances of increasing their share of leader-
ship positions at the top. Moreover, if only a few high-ability women 
apply for top positions, valuable human resources are wasted; it 
remains unsure whether the brightest and best are promoted.
Attempts to overcome the gender gap in competitiveness take 
two major avenues: Change the women or change the institutions 
(8). The first avenue involves attempts to make women more com-
petitive, for instance, by recommending that they “lean in” (9), that 
their self-consciousness is strengthened by priming (6, 7), and that 
they are given feedback (10). The second avenue aims to make in-
stitutions more gender neutral so that high-performing women are 
encouraged to “play their own game” instead of having to enter a 
competition inconsistent with their prevailing preferences. It has 
been shown that institutional approaches such as soft quotas and 
single-sex competitions significantly reduce the gender gap in com-
petition entry without diluting the quality of the resulting entrants 
(4, 11, 12). However, those approaches may cause unwarranted side 
effects (13). We therefore suggest and examine a previously uniden-
tified institutional approach: focal random selection. From a prese-
lected pool of the most highly qualified candidates, a lottery decides 
who wins promotion. We show in a laboratory experiment that un-
der these conditions, the gender gap in competition entry disappears.
Focal random selection has a long yet little-known history. It 
was applied in ancient Athens, in the Golden Age of Venice, and in 
other medieval cities such as Florence and Bern (14). At the University 
of Basel during the 18th century, vacant professorships were filled 
by lot from the three most qualified candidates (15, 16). The main 
reasons for using lotteries in former days were to avoid corruption 
and strong conflicts between influential dynasties (15). Today, focal 
random selection is used for allocating grants (17) and has been 
suggested for the selection of papers for publication (18) to over-
come problems arising from the peer review process. It has been 
tested as a means of overcoming hubris in group leaders (14). 
Through randomly selected citizens’ forums, it has been applied as 
a remedy against social selectivity in political decision-making (19). 
To our knowledge, it has never been applied to overcome the 
gender gap in competitiveness.
We propose that focal random selection reduces the gender gap 
in competitiveness by encouraging women to enter competitions. 
First, lotteries reduce competition and therefore tackle women’s 
aversion to competing. This aversion has been shown to persist after 
controlling for risk aversion, confidence, and feedback aversion (2). 
Second, women exhibit greater risk aversion than men (20). The 
impact of luck helps them to avoid the psychological costs of risky 
decision-making. Third, people who underestimate their abilities—
which is on average the case for women (21)—might be less anxious 
to apply for a shortlist with focal random selection because they 
need not think themselves superior. Fourth, high-ability women, in 
particular, are more averse to, and more strongly influenced by, 
negative feedback than are men. They are more likely to give up after 
a setback. This has been shown in both laboratory experiments (2) 
and the field (22). If the winner is determined mainly by luck, 
high-ability women’s greater anxiety concerning negative feedback 
is reduced. Fifth, discrimination and the fear of being discriminated 
against are excluded (23). Last, while men are valued for their com-
petitiveness, for example, for higher job status or higher salaries 
than women, females who win competitions in gender-mixed set-
tings are in danger of being considered unlikable (24). They deviate 
from social identity norms, which leads to psychological costs (25) 
such as annoyance and other negative feelings and a high rate of 
divorces (26). Numerous studies have confirmed that women anti-
cipate these costs (27–29). Random selection safeguards male losers 
from losing face, and female winners do not deviate from identity 
norms and therefore are able to avoid psychological costs.
In summary, focal random selection can enlarge the pool of suit-
able candidates for top positions with the many high-ability women 
who were previously discouraged from taking part in competitions. 
Instead of forcing women into strong competitions that they do not 
appreciate, and in which they are disadvantaged, selection mecha-
nisms are changed in a way that fits better into prevailing female 
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preferences. This is the main advantage of focal random selection. 
However, pure random selection alone has two main disadvantages. 
First, it does not distinguish between able and less able candidates. 
This disadvantage is mitigated by a thoughtful preselection of the 
most qualified candidates. The better the preselection works, the 
smaller is the difference between final candidates (30). Second, a 
taste for competition might be a desirable characteristic for leader-
ship positions. However, strong competition not only discourages 
women from applying for top jobs but may also trigger hubris in 
people, which can be mitigated by focal random selection (14). The 
intensity of competition might be varied, for instance, by adjusting 
the number of candidates who compete for a position or by the 
incentives provided for the winners (31). Therefore, the degree of 
competitiveness in the selection procedure must achieve a difficult 
balance between the contradictory characteristics of candidates.
METHODS
Table 1 summarizes the design of an incentivized laboratory exper-
iment conducted at the Decision Science Laboratory at ETH Zürich 
in November 2019 using zTree (32). In total, 210 male and 210 
female students were randomly selected from a pool of candidates. 
On average, they gained CHF 33 (USD 34) for 1 hour. We followed 
the procedure described by Balafoutas et al. (6), who investigated 
how the gender gap in competitiveness can be closed through prim-
ing (see the Supplementary Materials for details). Participants were 
randomly assigned to groups of three men and three women, and 
the groups were, in turn, assigned to one of three treatment condi-
tions. Each group in each condition went through three stages. The 
experimental task in each stage was to add up as many two-digit 
numbers as possible within 3 min. 
In stage 1, each participant received 1 MP (money point; 1 MP = 
CHF 0.5) for each correct calculation in a piece rate scheme, here 
called payment scheme A. In stage 2, the winner received 10 MP 
for each correct calculation and the other team members received 
nothing in a tournament or competition scheme; this is here called 
payment scheme B. Stage 2 included three treatments. In the per-
formance treatment, the member who solved the highest number of 
calculations was selected as the winner in a pure tournament. In the 
pure random treatment, the winner was chosen by lot. In the focal 
random treatment, the winner was drawn by lot from the three par-
ticipants who had solved the highest number of calculations cor-
rectly. In stage 3, the participants had to choose between payment 
scheme A or payment scheme B before solving the calculations. If 
participants in the performance selection treatment and the focal 
random treatment chose payment scheme B in stage 3, their perform-
ances at this stage were compared to their group’s other members’ 
performances in stage 2, thus avoiding the possibility that expecta-
tions about other members’ entry decisions might affect participants’ 
choices. Those performing equal or better than the fourth-listed 
group member in stage 2 were shortlisted in stage 3. The winner was 
then chosen at random from the shortlist; every member on the 
shortlist had a probability of one in three of winning. The winner’s 
payoff in stage 3 was 6 MP for each correct calculation. We then ran 
an investment task to measure risk preferences (33), and the partic-
ipants took questionnaires on gender stereotypes (34, 35) and basic 
demographic information.
RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the relative frequency with which participants in 
each treatment chose to compete in stage 3 and corresponding 95% 
confidence intervals (for descriptive statistics, see also table S1). In 
the performance treatment, men competed around three times as 
often as women [49.28% versus 14.49%; 2(1) = 22.33, P = 0.000]. 
However, in the pure random and focal random treatments, this 
gender gap becomes insignificant. In the pure random treatment, 
men’s entry rates were slightly lower and women’s entry rates were 
markedly higher than in the performance treatment [31.94% versus 
44.44%; 2(1) = 2.42, P = 0.123]. In the focal random treatment, men 
did not change their entry rates, but women markedly increased 
their entry rates relative to the performance treatment [47.83% versus 
40.58%; 2(1) = 0.74, P = 0.391]. This finding strongly supports our 
proposal that the gender gap in competition can be overcome by 
focal random selection. The pool of women who took part in com-
petitions was three times higher in the focal random treatment than 
in the performance treatment: 40.58 and 14.49%, respectively. Find-
ings are highly robust when we control for age, semester, and 
performance (see the Supplementary Materials: figs. S1 and S2 and 
tables S1 to S5). Not only is the proportion of female competitors 
higher under focal random selection than under performance selection; 
Table 1. Summary of the experimental design. We used the addition 
task test (2, 6) to study gender preferences for competition. It involves 
computing the sum of five randomly selected two-digit numbers and 
performing as many calculations as possible within 3 min. The participants 
had to solve the test in stages 1, 2, and 3. Swiss Francs (CHF) were 
expressed in money points (MPs); 1 MP = 0.5 CHF. 
Stage 1:
1 MP for each correct answer.Payment scheme A
Performance Pure random Focal random
treatment treatment treatment
Groups of three men and three women.
Performance is evaluated in comparison to the other 
group members.
Winner, 10 MP per correct calculation; other members, 
no payment.
Stage 2:
Payment 
scheme B
Winner = group 
member with the 
most correct 
answers.
Winner = 
drawn by lot.
Winner = 
drawn by lot 
from the three 
group 
members with 
the most 
correct 
answers.
Stage 3: Choose between payment scheme A (as in stage 1) or payment scheme B (as in stage 2).
Payment 
scheme A or B
Performance under scheme B is evaluated against the 
other group members’ performance in stage 2. Winner, 
6 MP per correct calculation; other members, no 
payment.
Number of 
Participants 138 144 138
Men 69 72 69
Women 69 72 69
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under this procedure, the proportion of women on the shortlist for 
winner selection is 45% (25 of 55), which then translates to 27.78% 
female winners (5 of 18), compared to 5.26% (1 of 19) under per-
formance selection and 57.14% (12 of 21) under random selection 
(see table S6 for more information).
Do focal random selections offer incentives to compete for men 
and women who perform above average? We use average stage 2 
performance across treatments (6.56 correctly solved problems) and 
average stage 3 performance across treatments (6.83 correctly solved) 
as reference points with which to identify over- and under-entry in 
stage 2 and stage 3, respectively. Above-average participants should 
choose scheme B (tournament or competition scheme), and below- 
average participants should choose scheme A (piece rate scheme). 
Opposing decisions are defined as under-entry and over-entry, 
respectively. In the performance treatment, the under-entry of men 
performing above average is half as great as the under-entry of 
women performing above average [43.9% versus 76. 9%; 2(1) = 7.07, 
P = 0.008], confirming former studies (2). In the focal random treat-
ment, the under-entry of men performing above average is higher, 
while the under-entry of women performing above average is lower, 
thereby closing the gender gap in underinvestment [56.1% versus 
60.0%; 2(1) = 0.10, P = 0.756; see Table 2]. These results remain 
robust when using stage 3 performance [performance selection: 
37.2% underinvestment among men versus 75.8% among women, 
2(1) = 11.17, P = 0.001; focal random selection: 55.0% men versus 
61.3% women, 2(1) = 0.283, P = 0.595] and in a robustness check 
making use of treatment-specific average performance instead of 
overall average performance (table S7). These findings are mirrored 
in the earnings in stage 3: men and women who perform below 
average earn significantly less than those performing above average, 
in both the performance (5.4 MP/5.4 MP versus 20.5 MP/7.2 MP) 
and focal random treatments (7.4 MP/5.3 MP versus 15.6 MP/11.1 MP; 
see Fig. 2 and table S8). However, the focal random treatment pro-
duces a larger gap between low- and high-performing women from 
1:1.3 to 1:2.1 and a smaller one for men from 1:3.8 to 1:2.1. Focal 
random selection thus closes the gender pay gap: It improves the 
earnings of high-performing women to nearly the same extent as it 
reduces those of high-performing men. 
Figures 3 to 6 demonstrate that in the performance treatment, 
women shy away from competition because of performance differ-
ences, risk aversion, underconfidence, and identity costs, support-
ing former research (2, 21, 22, 36–38). Figure 3A shows that in the 
performance treatment, high-performing men competed three times 
as often as high-performing women [63% versus 20%; 2(1) = 13.11, 
P = 0.000]. This gender gap closes in the pure random and focal 
random treatments in Fig. 3 (B and C): Relative to the performance 
treatment, the proportion of high-performing men entering com-
petition was half, whereas the proportion of high-performing women 
was nearly triple [pure random: 34% versus 53%; 2(1) = 1.58, 
P = 0.208; focal random: 38% versus 50%; 2(1) = 0.73, P = 0.394]. It 
shows that the pool of high-ability women who take part in compe-
titions is nearly double under focal random selection: 38%, against 
20% in the performance treatment. Figure 4A demonstrates that the 
performance treatment favors risk-seeking men: They competed 
nearly four times as often as risk-seeking women [62% versus 17%; 
2(1) =16.82, P = 0.000]. Conversely, Fig. 4B shows that the pure 
Fig. 1. Entry into competition of men and women in the treatments (n = 420). This figure shows the frequency with which men (=210) and women (=210) choose to 
compete in stage 3 in the treatments, including 95% confidence intervals. In the performance treatment, only 14.49% of women but 49.28% of men enter tournaments 
[2(1) = 22.33, P = 0.000], confirming that women shy away from competition. In the random treatment, only 31.94% of men but 44.44% of women enter tournaments 
[2(1) = 2.42, P = 0.123]. In the focal random treatment, 40.58% of women and 47.83% of men enter tournaments [2(1) = 0.74, P = 0.391], confirming that women do not 
shy away from competition under these conditions.
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random treatment favors risk-averse women: They chose this alter-
native nearly four times as often as risk-averse men [men versus 
women; 12% versus 40%; 2(1) = 9.19, P = 0.002]. Figure 4C sum-
marizes the results for the focal random treatment. Here, nearly the 
same proportions of risk-seeking men and women [57% versus 70%; 
2(1) = 1.04, P = 0.309] and of risk-averse men and women [23% 
versus 24%; 2(1) = 0.00, P = 0.950] enter competition. Figure 5A 
shows that overconfident men in the performance treatment 
Table 2. Over- and under-entry in stage 3. We use average stage 2 performance across treatments (6.56 correctly solved problems) and average stage 3 
performance across treatments (6.83 correctly solved) as reference points for over- and under-entry in stages 2 and 3, respectively. Above-average participants 
should choose scheme B, and below-average participants should choose scheme A. Opposing decisions are defined as under-entry and over-entry, respectively. 
Percentages are in parentheses. 
Performance treatment Random treatment Focal random treatment
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Calculations based on stage 2 performance
Under-entry
Number who should 
enter 41 26 36 28 41 25
Of those, how many 
do not enter 18 (43.9) 20 (76.9) 25 (69.4) 14 (50.0) 23 (56.1) 15 (60.0)
Over-entry
Number who should 
not enter 28 43 36 44 28 44
Of those, how many 
do enter 11 (39.3) 4 (9.3) 12 (33.3) 18 (40.9) 15 (53.6) 18 (40.9)
Calculations based on stage 3 performance
Under-entry
Number who should 
enter 43 33 46 29 40 31
Of those, how many 
do not enter 16 (37.2) 25 (75.8) 34 (73.9) 16 (55.2) 22 (55.0) 19 (61.3)
Over-entry
Number who should 
not enter 26 36 26 43 29 38
Of those, how many 
do enter 7 (26.9) 2 (5.6) 11 (42.3) 19 (44.2) 15 (51.7) 16 (42.1)
Fig. 2. Earnings of men and women in the performance and focal random treatments (n = 419). This figure shows the earnings of men and women in stage 3 for the 
performance treatment and focal random treatment, which depends on their average performance in stages 1 and 2. Earnings were calculated as marginal effects by con-
trolling for all independent variables (for the regression results, see table S5). According to this, men performing above average lose about 5 MP in the focal random treatment 
compared to the performance treatment [20.5 versus 15.6, 2(1) = 51.64, P = 0.000], whereas women performing above average gain about 4 MP [7.2 versus 11.1, 2(1) = 
18.42, P = 0.000], thereby producing lower gender differences in payouts in the focal random treatment. In the focal random treatment, the earnings of men performing 
above average are still around 50% higher than the earnings of average-performing men, thus offering serious incentives for a competition by performance also for men. 
***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.1 
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competed nearly six times as often as overconfident women [55% 
versus 10%; 2(1) = 15.97, P = 0.000]. The gender gap caused by 
overconfidence is lower in treatments with randomness, as shown 
in Fig. 5 (B and C): Relative to the performance treatment, the pro-
portion of overconfident men choosing this alternative was nearly 
half, whereas the proportion of overconfident women was four times 
[pure random: 26% versus 44%; 2(1) = 2.22, P = 0.136; focal random: 
31% versus 40%; 2(1) = 0.63, P = 0.427]. Last, Figure 6A illustrates 
that in the performance condition, men not conforming to typical 
masculine gender stereotypes competed 17 times as often as women 
not conforming to typical feminine gender stereotypes [50% versus 
3%; 2(1) = 38.52, P = 0.000]. The gender gap caused by gender 
stereotypes is completely eliminated in treatments with randomness, 
as illustrated in Fig. 6 (B and C): Relative to the performance treat-
ment, the proportion of competing women not conforming to gender 
stereotypes was 10-fold higher, whereas the proportion of compet-
ing men not conforming to gender stereotypes was more or less equal 
[men versus women; pure random: 23% versus 25%; 2(1) = 0.04, 
P = 0.845; focal random: 50% versus 35%; 2(1) = 0.86, P = 0.353].
DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that the pool of high-performing women who 
apply for top jobs can be substantially enlarged by the introduction 
of focal random selection. Consequently, the pipeline for women to 
leadership positions can be made less leaky without lowering candidates’ 
performance. Moreover, focal random selection closes the gender pay 
gap among high performers. In addition, differences between men 
Fig. 3. Mechanisms underlying the gender competition gap: average performance in stages 1 and 2 (n = 419). This figure illustrates the marginal effects of the 
choices of men and women in stage 3 depending on the underlying mechanism (mean ± 1 SD). We controlled for all variables as indicated in table S4, model 2. The inde-
pendent variable is average performance in stages 1 and 2. (A) In the performance treatment, 46% of high-performing men but only 27% of high-performing women 
enter competition [2(1) = 3.78, P = 0.052]. (B) In the pure random treatment, 28% of high-performing men and 56% of high-performing women enter payment scheme B 
[2(1) = 7.61, P = 0.006], indicating effects contrary to those of (A). (C) In the focal random treatment, 38% of high-performing men and 48% of high-performing women 
enter competition [2(1) = 0.83, P = 0.362], showing that performance has no effect on gender-specific choices in this treatment condition.
Fig. 4. Mechanisms underlying the gender competition gap: risk aversion after the end of stage 3 (n = 419). This figure illustrates the marginal effects of the choices 
of men and women in stage 3 depending on the underlying mechanism (mean ± 1 SD). We controlled for all variables as indicated in table S4, model 2. The independent 
variable is risk aversion measured after the end of stage 3 with a simple investment game. Participants received an endowment of 12 MP, which they could invest in a risky 
asset or keep for themselves. Any amount between 0 and 12 MP could be invested. The investment had a 50% chance of being successful. In the case of success, the in-
vested amount was multiplied by 2.5 and paid back to the participant. If the investment was not successful, the invested amount was lost. MPs not invested were kept by 
participants. Higher investments in this task thus indicate a greater willingness to take risks. (A) In the performance treatment, 60% of risk-seeking men but only 18% of 
risk-seeking women enter competition [2(1) = 12.91, P = 0.000]. (B) In the pure random treatment, 45% of risk-seeking men and 57% of risk-seeking women enter pay-
ment scheme B [2(1) = 0.50, P = 0.481], but only 11% of risk-averse men and 43% of risk-averse women [2(1) = 11.69, P = 0.001]. (C) In the focal random treatment, 55% 
of risk-seeking men and 71% of risk-seeking women enter competition [2(1) = 1.61, P = 0.447], and 23% of risk-averse men and 26% of risk-averse women [2(1) = 0.04, 
P = 0.833], showing that risk aversion has no effects on gender-specific choices.
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and women in entering competition caused by gender stereotypes 
are completely eliminated by randomness. Our findings, therefore, 
point to the relevance of gender stereotypes as an underlying mecha-
nism of gender gap in competitiveness. Further research is required 
to find out which degree of competitiveness should be applied in the 
focal random selection procedure to achieve adequate characteris-
tics of the selected leader. More research is also needed to study the 
effects of focal random selection in the field.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/6/47/eabb2142/DC1
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